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Chad: External Dimensions of Factional Strife

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An Intelligence Memorandum

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**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Chad: External Dimensions of Factional Strife

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An Intelligence Memorandum

*Information available as of 3 April 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

This memorandum was written by [redacted]
the Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, West and East Africa
Division, ALA, [redacted]

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This memorandum has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and with the National
Intelligence Council. [redacted]

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
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Figure 1



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Chad: External
Dimensions of
Factional Strife

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Summary

The unresolved power struggle in Chad is again causing concern among neighboring states, as the likelihood of renewed internal hostilities increases. Nigeria and the Central African Republic fear that a full-fledged resumption of Chad's 17-year-old civil war would heighten regional unrest and encourage new Libyan meddling. Moderate North African states, such as Egypt and Sudan, share these concerns and are trying to discourage major new civil strife in order to limit opportunities for Libyan intrigue. Moderate governments throughout the region also are concerned about President Goukouni's recent efforts to shore up his shaky coalition regime by accepting arms from Algeria and requesting aid from other radical African states.

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Peacekeeping troops sent to Chad late last year by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have had some success in containing the country's chronic factional strife, but without continued Western funding the bulk of the force probably will be withdrawn by the end of June. The collapse of the peacekeeping operations before then could discourage African countries from mounting similar efforts in the future. It would also be a propaganda victory for Libyan leader Qadhafi, whose troops kept order in Chad for nearly a year before they withdrew last November.

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An OAU pullout in the absence of progress toward a negotiated settlement would clear the way for new gains by Chadian rebels led by Hissein Habre that could force Goukouni to ask the Libyans to return.

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Qadhafi would be reluctant to become involved militarily again soon. He is preparing to assume the post of OAU chairman in August, which will require him to project a more statesmanlike image.

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Libya may thus have decided to dissociate itself from Goukouni and work quietly to replace him with someone more open to its influence, such as Foreign Minister Acyl. Western hopes for improved security in central and western Africa would suffer a blow if behind-the-scenes maneuvering led to the emergence of a regime that would allow Libya to use Chad again as a springboard for regional subversion.

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The USSR and Cuba are unlikely to involve themselves heavily in Chad in the foreseeable future, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Moscow and Havana seem unenthusiastic about Chad's nonideological power struggle, and would have little to gain from close association with the country unless prospects for leftist rule in N'Djamena greatly improve. Soviet and Cuban propaganda will seek new opportunities to link the West—especially the United States—to Chadian unrest. [REDACTED]

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Modest Western economic aid to Chad has marginally reduced the country's vulnerability to foreign meddling and has provided limited influence over events there. French President Mitterrand, according to Ministry of Cooperation officials, believes that a political solution to Chad's domestic imbroglio is almost impossible at present, although his government continues to seek one. African leaders may make scapegoats of France and the United States if Western-backed efforts to prevent a major upheaval fail. [REDACTED]

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**Chad: External
Dimensions of
Factional Strife**

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Figure 2. Chadian President Goukouni: struggling to survive. Camera Press ©



Figure 3. Rebel leader Habre: determined to regain a government role. Sygma ©

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**Chad: An
Ungovernable
Entity?**

Chad, stretching from the Sahara Desert in Arab-influenced and Muslim North Africa to the savannas of Christian and animist black Africa in the south, is at the crossroads of powerful and competing cultural and religious influences. It is less a nation than a convenient geographic designation for an arena where hostile armed bands wage an age-old power struggle with few if any ideological pretensions. The country's strategic location and recurrent turmoil have made it an exploitable target for Libyan adventurism that threatens moderate states and Western interests in the region.

Prospects for preventing more fighting are poor. President Goukouni's feeble, Muslim-dominated, coalition government continues to face a serious threat from anti-Libyan rebel leader Habre, whose insurgents took advantage of Libya's military withdrawal late last year to leave their strongholds near the Sudanese border and infiltrate large areas of northern and eastern Chad. Habre, a former Defense Minister, is determined to regain a leading role in the government and, in the absence of any serious progress toward a negotiated settlement, he may soon conclude he has no



Figure 4. Habre's rebels: government troops are no match. [redacted]

Sygya ©

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choice but to try to seize power. Such a move could touch off another round of free-for-all civil war and lead to more Libyan meddling. This worries many of Chad's neighbors, some of whom have conflicting strategies to contain the country's political strife. There seems to be little they or the West can do, however, to forestall additional conflict. [redacted]

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Libyan Interests

Libyan leader Qadhafi's interest in Chad stems from a variety of historical and cultural factors. These include:

- The fact that about half the population of Chad is Muslim.
- The activities of the Libyan-based Sanusi Islamic order in 19th century Chad, which gave rise to Islam's quasi-political-religious domination of the country.
- The presence in Chad of nomadic Arab tribes.
- Age-old trade patterns. [redacted]

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In the late 1960s, the Libyan kingdom began to aid Muslim insurgents during their struggle against the Christian, French-backed, southern-dominated Tombalbaye regime. After Qadhafi came to power in 1969, Libyan support for Chad's Muslims gradually increased. In 1973, Libyan troops occupied the Aozou Strip in northern Chad, which Tripoli claimed on the basis of old Sanusi ties and on an unratified 1935 treaty between Italy and France, the former colonial rulers of Libya and Chad. Libya unilaterally annexed the strip in 1975. [redacted]

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Figure 5. Libyan leader Qadhafi: continued interest in Chad. Franz Furst ©

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Libyan motives for involvement in Chad gradually shifted from a desire to help "oppressed" Muslims to an interest in engineering a Chadian government responsive to Libyan direction. Over time, Libya has funded virtually all northern political factions that have emerged in Chad. Although Tripoli did not play a decisive role in Muslim President Goukouni's rise to power, Libyan arms helped make possible his capture of N'Djamena from southern Chadian forces in 1979. [REDACTED]

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Libyan involvement in Chad reached a peak in October 1980, when Qadhafi intervened militarily at Goukouni's request to reverse the regime's waning fortunes in its war against rebel Defense Minister Habre. Two months after entering Chad, some 7,000 Libyan troops established control of N'Djamena and key population centers in the northern half of the country. With Goukouni dependent on Tripoli for his political survival, Qadhafi saw an opportunity to seek political union with Chad as the first step toward incorporating west African Sahelian countries and Sudan into a Pan-Islamic grouping stretching from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. Qadhafi at one time went so far as to compel Goukouni to sign a joint statement asserting their "intention" to merge. Subsequent Libyan attempts to push Goukouni further along this path figured in the Chadian President's decision last November to call publicly for the withdrawal of Libyan troops. Goukouni evidently had concluded that Qadhafi was on the verge of removing him in favor of Foreign Minister Acyl, an ethnic Arab more amenable to Libyan influence. [REDACTED]

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Libya's extensive investment of money and manpower in Chad gained Tripoli a relatively pacified southern neighbor strongly under its influence, though not under its control. Chad's strategic location made it a useful staging ground for subversion elsewhere in the region, especially against Sudan, whose government is now Libya's prime target. [REDACTED]

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The intervention in Chad was costly for Qadhafi, both domestically and internationally. Heavy casualties in Chad, and the mobilization and draft caused by the war, eroded his already flagging popularity at home. The OAU's black African majority had roused itself to condemn the occupation in its initial stages, and the Libyan presence in Chad gave Western nations—particularly the United States—a prime example of Libyan expansionist aims. Finally, the occupation was a major expense at a time when Libyan oil production was half the normal output and when Tripoli's financial reserves were dwindling rapidly. All these factors, combined with a reluctance to go back on his public promise to withdraw if asked by Goukouni and a desire to prove to the Chadian President that he could not make a go of it alone, prompted Qadhafi's abrupt compliance with Goukouni's withdrawal request. [REDACTED]

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The Libyan pullout, however, has not ended Qadhafi's interest in keeping a hand in Chad's future. He undoubtedly derives satisfaction from the resumption of civil strife in Chad because it supports his view that only Libya can control the situation there. Qadhafi almost certainly would like to see the security situation deteriorate so badly that Goukouni is forced to ask Libyan troops to return. [REDACTED]

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For the moment, Qadhafi probably is reluctant to become militarily involved again. Libyan oil revenues continue to decline, reducing money available for such interventions. Moreover, Qadhafi recently has made major efforts to refurbish his image in Europe, something that a return to Chad would undermine. Perhaps most important, the Libyan leader is preoccupied with preparations for the OAU summit in Tripoli in August, and he wants no last-minute African boycott. His coming year's tenure as OAU chairman and a continued soft oil market should combine to restrain overt Libyan adventurism for the short term. [REDACTED]

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These factors, however, will not deter Qadhafi from devising behind-the-scenes strategies to bring about a pro-Libyan power shift in N'Djamena. His many clients in Chad remain eager for Libyan money and thus provide him considerable leverage. Feuding Muslim factions in northern Chad offer especially attractive targets for continued Libyan manipulation. Chad's political divisions run so deep it is unlikely that any faction or coalition could restore sufficient order in the foreseeable future to limit

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Figure 6. President Goukouni (left) with French President Mitterrand (right): flagging French support. [redacted]

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opportunities for Libyan intrigue. At the same time, no Chadian leader—whatever his previous flirtations with Qadhafi—is likely to legitimize Libya's annexation of the Aozou Strip or agree to a formal merger with Libya. [redacted]

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France: Limited Goals and Means

Under President Mitterrand, French policy in Chad during the past year has been two-pronged. Paris has supported the Goukouni regime with limited financial and military aid, while encouraging an African solution to the country's problems by providing diplomatic and military assistance to the OAU peacekeeping operation. France evidently believes its best course for now is to monitor developments and try to discourage the worst excesses of civil war—and a possible resumption of Libyan intrigue—by periodically prodding Chadian factional leaders to negotiate. French options are limited by Mitterrand's reluctance to intervene militarily in black Africa unless vital French interests are involved, as well as by divisions within the French Government over strategies to promote a reconciliation of Chad's feuding factions. [redacted]

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France, which colonized Chad in the late 19th century, is partly responsible for the country's instability and the threat it poses to regional security. Although the French fought hard to conquer Chad, they largely neglected it thereafter. Chad consequently stagnated during some 60 years of French colonial rule and gained independence in 1960 with a very weak economy and virtually no chance of containing its smoldering ethnic and regional

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tensions. [] French troops intervened in 1969 to stave off a victory by northern insurgents over N'Djamena's southern-dominated government, but during the next 10 years France was unable to prevent recurrent bouts of civil war. Ultimately, these led to the collapse of southern political dominance and the emergence of the fractious, Muslim-dominated Goukouni regime. []

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After the Libyans intervened in 1980 to contain Habre's rebellion, France's then President Giscard worked quietly with Egypt and Sudan to help the rebel leader organize an anti-Libyan insurgency in eastern Chad. Mitterrand suspended French aid to the rebels after his election last May and turned French energies to sustaining Goukouni as the best way to keep the lid on factional tensions. French diplomatic pressure under both Giscard and Mitterrand played a major role in Goukouni's decision late last year to ask the Libyans to leave. At the same time, recent French budgetary support to the Chadian Government has been badly mismanaged by N'Djamena and thus has done little to bolster Chad against behind-the-scenes Libyan influence-peddling, which presumably continues. []

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There are some recent indications that France is growing impatient with Goukouni's refusal to negotiate with Habre. The French, in February 1982, halted shipments of military equipment to N'Djamena—mostly small arms and ammunition—to persuade Goukouni to abandon his unrealistic notions of a military victory against the rebels. Since mid-March, Paris has increased diplomatic efforts to win Goukouni's endorsement of a plan for national reconciliation. Under the latest French scheme, Chad's numerous factional leaders would coexist in a new provisional government, which would integrate all private militias into a truly impartial national army and prepare the country for elections. To help the plan work, France would be willing to resume substantial economic and military aid including advisers to help train the Army. The French almost certainly realize that such a plan would be rejected by Goukouni, who probably would be forced to step down in favor of a compromise candidate. Indeed, France may be using such proposals to spotlight the Chadian President as the chief impediment to progress on the issue. []

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Mitterrand []

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[] evidently anticipates major new fighting in the months ahead and seems

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prepared—despite continued French efforts to broker a settlement—to let events take their course. If Habre decides to move on N'Djamena, Paris probably would promptly establish contacts with whatever new government emerges to forestall possible new Libyan inroads. [] 25X1

Chad's Moderate
Black African
Neighbors

Moderate black Africans view Chad with alarm. They doubt that a peaceful solution is possible, despite their efforts to encourage one. Yet, they fear that failure to end the fighting would fan border problems and heighten the danger of foreign intrigue. Curbing Qadhafi is their chief aim, but France is also a concern. [] 25X1

Nigeria, as the largest and most powerful state in West Africa and one that aspires to black African leadership, has played a leading role in recent inter-African initiatives on the Chadian problem. Lagos has exerted considerable diplomatic pressure on Goukouni to negotiate with Habre, and has contributed the largest contingent to the 3,800-man OAU peacekeeping force, which continues to be the only major deterrent to further gains by Habre's rebels. [] 25X1

The Nigerians are trying to preserve Chad as a nonaligned buffer between North Africa and black Africa, and thus deny Libya a staging area for further Sub-Saharan ambitions. Lagos worries, for example, that the potential for meddling in predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria would be seriously enhanced if Libya regained extensive influence in Chad. Nigeria's ambitions for a neutral Chad also are intended to reduce opportunities for the restoration of a large French presence there. Lagos has long viewed France as a competitor for influence in the region and seeks over the long run to reduce the French presence where possible. [] 25X1

Nigeria, however, does not have an open-ended commitment to these goals. Without continued Western funding, all three of the financially strapped OAU troop-donor countries may have no choice but to pull out by 30 June, regardless of how precarious the security situation may be. Such a debacle could affect the OAU's willingness to mount future police actions and would embarrass Nigerian President Shagari, Zairian President Mobutu, and the current OAU chairman, Kenyan President Moi, all of whom are closely identified with Western-backed efforts to stabilize Chad. []

Niger's pro-Western military government recently resumed diplomatic ties with the Libyans, but it remains wary of Qadhafi and suspects that Libyan meddling similar to that which led to a suspension of relations in January 1981 will continue. The Kountche regime is especially concerned about

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possible renewed Libyan use of Chad as a staging area for subversive activities throughout the region. Libyan troops, during their occupation of Chad, set up radio stations to supplement propaganda broadcasts from Tripoli urging Niger's nomadic Tuareg minority to revolt. Libya may also have taken advantage of the long Chad-Niger border to smuggle arms to Nigerien dissidents. [REDACTED]

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As the fourth-largest uranium producer in the non-Communist world, Niger figures prominently in Qadhafi's ambitions to develop a nuclear energy capability and to unite the southern Saharan countries under his control. President Kountche probably realizes that keeping the Libyans out of Chad will not by itself blunt these ambitions, but he may believe that new efforts by Qadhafi to aggravate regional tensions would be easier to detect and monitor if they had to be staged from Libya itself. Kountche expects that France—which imports one-third of its uranium from Niger—almost certainly would come to his aid if his government were seriously threatened by clearly Libyan-backed subversion. [REDACTED]

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Nonaligned but Western-leaning *Cameroon*—one of black Africa's most stable and prosperous nations—has twice since 1979 had to cope with financial and security problems caused by Chadian refugees fleeing factional fighting. The last influx reached a peak in early 1981, when some 100,000 Chadians—twice the number that crossed into Nigeria—took sanctuary in an internment camp in the northern Cameroonian border town of Kousseri. Despite repatriation and resettlement efforts by the Cameroonian Government and international relief agencies, 25,000 refugees were still living in Kousseri in March 1982, when Yaounde sent troops to evict them. Cameroon took this step possibly in response to Chadian Government claims that the camp had become a nest for rebel sympathizers. [REDACTED]

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A rebel attack on N'Djamena would bring a new influx of Chadian refugees and could prompt Cameroon to position troops at the border to stem the flow. Chances of a major clash between the two countries are slim, but factional fighting in Chad could easily spill across the border and might draw a limited response from Cameroon's small but effective French-trained Army. Friction could also ensue if a full-fledged resumption of civil war in Chad forced OAU troops to retreat into Cameroon, as did Nigerian and Congolese soldiers in 1979 after they were sent to N'Djamena in an unsuccessful attempt to calm sectarian strife. [REDACTED]

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Cameroon, pessimistic about Chad's prospects for peace, has avoided being tied publicly to high-risk inter-African efforts to resolve the crisis.

[REDACTED]

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[redacted] The Ahidjo government keeps a close eye on Libyan activities in Cameroon but is not outwardly worried about Qadhafi, who has obtained little backing from Cameroon's influential Muslim minority. [redacted]

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The Central African Republic's pro-Western Kolingba government is facing mounting political dissent, and seems increasingly vulnerable to potential Libyan-backed subversion. General Kolingba—who as Army Chief of Staff reluctantly assumed power last September when leftists threatened to overthrow the hapless Dacko regime—is especially worried about the possibility of major turmoil in the CAR's troubled northern regions if Libya were to use Chad again as a conduit for subversive activities. Fragmentary evidence suggests that the Libyans during their occupation of Chad smuggled arms through the country to CAR dissidents opposed to then President Dacko. [redacted]

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Even small-scale Libyan meddling in the CAR could play havoc with the country's endemic economic and tribal tensions and possibly derail economic recovery efforts that hold the key to his government's survival. Libyan interference also could cause more headaches for the French, who view the CAR as strategically important to their regional interests. [redacted]

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Egypt and Sudan

Moderate North African states view Chad with much the same uncertainty and apprehension as their black African counterparts. None, despite their membership in the OAU, is directly involved in efforts by that organization to achieve a political solution. [redacted]

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Cairo and Khartoum in the past year or so have worked closely with each other and with France and the United States to try to limit the danger Chad poses to regional security. Egypt is worried about Libyan expansionist aims throughout the southern Sahara and sees Chad as an arena for Western-backed efforts to thwart Tripoli. Sudan is more concerned about its own border security problems and has focused on finding ways to deter Libya from exploiting political and tribal tensions in the Chad-Sudan border area. Fragmentary evidence suggests that since 1980 Qadhafi has intermittently tried to destabilize the pro-Western Nimeiri government by smuggling arms and drawing up plans to infiltrate Libyan-trained Sudanese dissidents into Sudan through eastern Chad. [redacted]

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The Egyptians and Sudanese, who look to Habre as their principal hedge against the emergence of an openly pro-Libyan regime in Chad, in recent years have provided arms to the rebel leader. In 1981 Sudan served as a conduit for coordinated French, Egyptian, and Moroccan military aid that

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enabled Habre to mount a low-level insurgency against Libyan troops shortly before they withdrew from Chad. Paris cut off aid soon after the Mitterrand government took power last May, but Egypt and Sudan continued to help the rebels until the following November, when they stopped all assistance pending the outcome of OAU efforts to ease factional tensions. []

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[] If a pro-Libyan power shift were to occur in N'Djamena or if Libyan troops returned to Chad, the Egyptians and Sudanese almost certainly would resume arms shipments to the rebels. []

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**Radical Africans:
Algeria and Ethiopia**

Algeria's left-leaning Bendjedid government has recently strengthened ties with N'Djamena as part of its continuing effort to frustrate Libyan ambitions in the region. Algeria evidently believes the best way to counter Libyan influence in Chad and prevent another Libyan military intervention there is to help the Goukouni regime gain enough strength politically and militarily to fend for itself. Since January Algiers has been flying frequent shipments of food, medicine, and arms to N'Djamena. It has also sent small groups of military advisers to supervise the distribution of this aid and to work with a team of OAU observers overseeing the activities of the peacekeeping force. []

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Ironically, Algerian aid seems to have at least temporarily weakened prospects for a negotiated settlement in Chad by directly or indirectly strengthening both sides and thus giving them less incentive to talk. Although government forces have suffered serious setbacks in recent fighting with the rebels, Goukouni now has the means to stave off talking with Habre, and is unlikely to negotiate as long as he can obtain arms from Algeria or elsewhere. The Algerians also have inadvertently helped strengthen the rebels, who during the past few months have captured large quantities of arms from government troops. []

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By unintentionally fanning tensions in Chad, Algeria could prompt new Libyan meddling rather than deter it. Another period of civil war in Chad almost certainly would draw some kind of Libyan response. The Algerians would not openly challenge Qadhafi if he renewed his interest in Chad but they probably would work quietly with moderate black African and Arab countries and the West to minimize Libyan involvement. []

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Marxist, pro-Libyan Ethiopia sees Chad as a peripheral concern and has turned aside recent Chadian Government requests for arms to fight Habre. Although the Ethiopians support N'Djamena's refusal to negotiate with pro-Western rebel leaders there, they are not enthusiastic about Goukouni, who lacks credentials as a "progressive" leader. At the same time, Addis Ababa probably does not oppose military aid to N'Djamena by other black radical states such as Congo [redacted]

Although Ethiopia has refused to be drawn directly into the Chadian problem, it has recently begun to exploit it for propaganda purposes by condemning the OAU's call for peace talks among Chadian factions as a Western-backed ploy to replace Goukouni with Habre. The Mengistu government almost certainly will continue to look for ways to tie France and especially the United States to Chad's troubles and may even coordinate such efforts with the Soviet Union and Libya. [redacted]


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The Soviets
and Cubans


The Soviets view Chad, according to leftist African officials, as a low-priority target of opportunity. Moscow is said to see little chance of leftist rule taking root in N'Djamena and thus has avoided activist policies that could expose it to African and Western charges of meddling in Chadian affairs. Although Moscow quietly sent a small number of military technicians to Chad during the Libyan occupation to help Tripoli maintain its Soviet-manufactured aircraft and armored vehicles, Soviet leaders probably would not welcome a blatant new Libyan military adventure in Chad out of fear that it would generate broad African opposition. [redacted]

Cuba probably is willing to take on additional military burdens in black Africa, but Havana is hesitant to involve itself in Chad, where the risks far outweigh the possible gains. [redacted]

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Although the USSR and Cuba are likely to keep a low profile in Chad for the foreseeable future, they nonetheless will continue to exploit opportunities to implicate the West in Chad's problems. Moscow might even quietly maneuver in the UN or other international forums to discourage progress toward a negotiated settlement in Chad and thus ensure that the matter remains a headache for Western policymakers and a source of regional unrest. 

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Implications for the United States

The United States has little direct interest in Chad itself, but the country is important to broader US efforts to curb Libyan adventurism in Sub-Saharan Africa. The United States has made a substantial public commitment in support of the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad and has backed this up with \$12 million in assistance for its Nigerian and Zairian contingents. US prestige thus is closely tied to Western-backed efforts by the OAU to achieve a peaceful solution to the Chadian problem that minimizes opportunities for more Libyan intrigue. African leaders probably would be quick to try to shift the blame onto Washington if the OAU—for whatever reason—failed to avert another full-scale Chadian upheaval. 

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A US decision to back away from the search for solutions in Chad would reduce the political risks for Washington, but it could also exasperate moderate African leaders who have worked with the United States to find a solution and remove what little chance there is of progress toward a negotiated settlement before Libya assumes the OAU chairmanship in August. Qadhafi as chairman will be in a better position to frustrate further Western initiatives and to influence the extent of continued inter-African involvement in Chad. 

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Similarly, a US decision to intensify diplomatic pressure for a prompt settlement could also be counterproductive. Although the United States has gained little influence with Goukouni during the past year, it has provided some food aid to Chad through bilateral shipments to N'Djamena and through support for international relief agencies helping Chadian refugees in Cameroon. Goukouni is convinced that the United States wants to install Habre in power, and US arm twisting at this stage probably would only harden his determination to avoid being drawn into talks with the rebel leader. 

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Figure 7. Goukouni (right) and Habre (left), in 1979: prospects for another reconciliation are poor.

Sygma ©

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Even if behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the United States or other parties somehow led to an accommodation among the numerous feuding factions, it almost certainly would be short lived. Although Chadian factional leaders have tried from time to time to reconcile their differences and work together, resentments are so deep that agreements invariably collapse. It may still be possible to ward off another major round of civil war, but factional squabbling is likely to continue for years.

Western and moderate African interests in Chad would not necessarily be jeopardized by a military solution. The replacement of Goukouni by Habre or another northern military strongman wary of Libyan influence could set the stage for an eventual marriage of convenience between the new leader and southern Chad's cautious, pro-Western, Christian strongman, Vice President Kamougue. Although there is much hatred among southern Chadians toward Habre—whom they consider to be brutal and ruthless—Chad's history of pragmatic political alignments suggests that such an accommodation is not impossible. A new north-south axis could preserve the illusion of national unity while permitting northern and southern Chad to retain their identities as virtually separate states.

The most serious risks for US interests would emerge if there is no settlement and an extended conflict results. This would create conditions most conducive to expanded influence by Libya and other radical states, and could result in heightened tensions between the United States and moderate African states seeking solutions to Chadian problems.

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